Mercer Law Review
Volume 27
Number 4 Fifth Circuit Survey Issue

Article 5

7-1976

Constitutional-Criminal Law
J. Michael Walls

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Criminal Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Walls, J. Michael (1976) "Constitutional-Criminal Law," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 27 : No. 4 , Article 5.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol27/iss4/5

This Survey Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

CONSTITUTIONAL-CRIMINAL LAW
By J.

MICHAEL WALLS*

The purpose of this article is to provide a discussion of the most interesting and noteworthy cases decided by the Fifth Circuit during 1975 in the
area of constitutional criminal law. Although this circuit rendered approximately two hundred criminal opinions involving the constitutional protections guaranteed in the criminal process, relatively few cases dominated
this field. Because of the importance of these cases, the author felt compelled to provide a fairly in depth treatment of several more significant
decisions. However, in so doing every effort was made to avoid straying
from the primary purpose of the article which is to survey the general area
of constitutional criminal law.
I.

CALLEY V. CALLAWAY

By far the most significant decision handed down during 1975 involving
constitutional criminal considerations was the court's en banc decision in
the case of Calley v. Callaway.' That case involved several constitutional
issues, three of which will be discussed under separate headings.
A.

Review of Court-MartialProceedings

The case of Calley v. Callaway was a review of a petition for habeas
corpus relief which alleged violations of constitutional rights in a courtmartial proceeding. Therefore, the court was compelled at the outset of its
opinion to determine the proper scope of review within the federal court
system of contentions which have been previously considered and rejected
by military courts. It was concluded that the power of federal courts to
review military convictions depends on the nature of the issues raised. Four
inquiries were established as necessary in making this determination' although it was acknowledged that the courts of appeals are divided as to
the proper scope of review.'
The four inquiries established in Calley are:
1. The asserted error must be of substantialconstitutionaldimension.
This was stated to mean that the claim of error must be so fundamental
as to have resulted in a miscarriage of justice.'
*

Staff Assistant Attorney General, Dept. of Law, State of Georgia. Georgia Southern

College (A.B., 1968); Cumberland School of Law, Samford University (J.D., 1973). Member
of Ohio and Georgia Bars.
1. 519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1975).
2. Id. at 199.
3. Id. at 198.
4. See Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? CollateralAttack on CriminalJudgments, 38 U.
CHI. L. REV. 142 (1970).
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2. The issue must be one of law ratherthan of disputed fact already
determined by the military tribunals.
3. Military considerationsmay warrant different treatment of constitutional claims. This inquiry concerns whether factors peculiar to the

military or important military considerations require a different constitutional standard.
4. The military courts must give adequate considerationto the issues
involved and apply proper legal standards.
These were the principles which guided the court in disposing of the
other issues involved in Calley and which will serve to guide future reviews
of courts-martial in this circuit.
B.

Pre-TrialPublicity

An area of constitutional law which has been the subject of a considerable amount of discussion in recent months is the apparent conflict between
the first amendment free press guaranties and the right of an accused to
receive a fair trial, unprejudiced by excessive pretrial publicity. Two cases
of interest in this area were decided by the Fifth Circuit during the period
being surveyed-Calley v. Callaway,' and United States v. Williams., Both
cases were appealed from United States district courts in Georgia,7 and
both concerned factual situations which were of national interest. In each
instance the lower court was reversed, but in so ruling the appellate court
reached opposite conclusions on the critical issue of pre-trial publicity.
In Calley, the court held that there was no denial of a fair trial even
though extensive pre-trial publicity had existed. The court disagreed with
the district court's findings that the publicity was improper, largely
biased, and undoubtedly prejudicial to the point that "it was not humanly
possible for the jurors not to be improperly influenced by prior exposure.",
The court expressly declined to accept the premise that "prominence
brings prejudice" and determined from the facts surrounding Calley's trial
that pre-trial publicity had not been sufficiently prejudicial to have violated his sixth amendment rights. The opinion pointed out that newspaper
clippings from articles written at the time of Calley's trial described the
sentiment at Fort Benning and neighboring Columbus, Georgia, as being
generally favorable to Lieutenant Calley. Furthermore, it was noted that
surveys conducted by Time magazine reached the conclusion that, even
when publicity was at its peak, there was considerable sympathy for Calley.' Moreover, the court felt that the district court had ignored the rule
5. 519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1975). Calley's petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was denied. See 44 U.S.L.W. 3534 (Mar. 23, 1976).
6. 523 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1975).
7. Calley was from the Middle District of Georgia at Columbus, and Williams from the
Northern District of Georgia at Atlanta.
8. 519 F.2d at 205.
9. Id. at 206.

19761

CONSTITUTIONAL-CRIMINAL

that a "prejudicial publicity claim must be viewed differently when the
news accounts complained of are 'straight news stories rather than invidious articles which tend to arouse ill will and vindictiveness.' "10The recency of publicity was also considered to be a critical factor; and in the
case of William Calley, there was a considerable lapse of time between the
peak of the publicity and the commencement of the trial. For these reasons
the court refused to presume prejudice.
Having refused to presume prejudice, the Calley court went on to determine that the members of the court martial tribunal had in fact been
impartial. The majority opinion pointed out that there was a presumption
that the court martial members would be impartial, and concluded that
the district court had taken too lightly the statements made, after extensive questioning under oath by members of the court-martial board, to the
effect that their decision would not be influenced by pre-trial publicity.
Finally, the court was unable to find any evidence of actual, isolatable
prejudice which could be traced to the pre-trial publicity.
United States v. Williams" involved an appeal by the convicted kidnaper of Reg Murphy, the former editor of The Atlanta Constitution.Without mentioning Calley, which had been decided en banc only a little over
three months earlier, the panel before whom Williams was argued
unanimously reversed the conviction of defendant Williams because of
prejudicial pre-trial publicity.
In Williams, the court found pervasive community prejudice sufficient
to dispense with the requirement that actual prejudice be shown. Specifically, it was found that the
wide dissemination of Murphy's comments on the [defendant's] personality, . . . the character of those comments, . . . their proximity to the
trial, . . .and the familiarity of the panel members with the crime
charged, . . . all suggest the probability of a proceeding not limited to the
evidence properly introduced before the trier of fact."
How can Williams be distinguished from Calley? In Williams, the court
attached particular significance to a televised news special featuring Reg
Murphy which was aired in Atlanta shortly before the commencement of
Williams' trial. In the news special, Murphy made comments concerning
Williams' anti-Semitic views and his insecurity, and portrayed Williams
as being given to lying. Perhaps the court considered these comments to
be more in the nature of "invidious statements tending to arouse ill will
and vindictiveness" than were the news stories concerning Calley which
the court considered to be "straight news reporting." The Williams panel
10. Id. at 206, quoting from Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 556, 82 S.Ct. 955, 963, 8
L.Ed.2d 98, 111 (1962).
11. 523 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1975).
12. Id. at 1209-10.
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was also concerned that the news special featuring Reg Murphy occurred
close in time to the beginning of Williams' trial. As has been previously
shown, the Calley court found significance in the fact that the peak of
publicity concerning Lieutenant Calley occurred several months before the
beginning of his trial. As to the other reason given in Williams, that of the
familiarity of the jury with the crime charged, it is doubtful that the panel
in Calley was any less familiar with the particular crime than was the jury
in Williams.
The possibility that all three members of the panel in Williams were not
in agreement with the en banc pre-trial publicity ruling in Calley is worthy
of note. Of the three judges deciding Williams, Senior Circuit Judge Tuttle
did not sit on the Calley appeal, and Circuit Judges Thornberry and Morgan dissented from the majority in Calley. Judges Thornberry and Morgan
apparently dissented only from that part of the majority opinion relating
to the failure of Congress to produce subpoenaed materials. However, the
dissenters would have required a retrial, and it was stated in the dissenting
opinion that the retrial would pretermit decision as to pre-trial publicity
since a retrial atmosphere would be void of the extensive publicity which
preceded the original trial. 3 This statement, standing alone, is not considered by this writer to profess disagreement with the majority on the issue
of pre-trial publicity. Yet because of this statement, and the fact that the
dissenting judges did not specifically state that they were in agreement
with the majority on the issue of pre-trial publicity, it cannot be presumed
that these judges applied the same standards in making their determination as did the majority in Calley.
C. Discovery of CongressionalTestimony
A third significant question was considered in Calley. This issue involved the discovery of congressional testimony and constituted the only
portion of the opinion from which any of the en banc court dissented.' 4
Specifically, Calley's lawyers had sought to obtain all the testimony taken
before a subcommittee appointed by the House Armed Services Committee to investigate the My Lai incident. The House of Representatives,
however, refused to release the requested evidence.
The district court had held that Congress' refusal violated the Jencks
Act'5 and that the inability of the defense to obtain the congressional
testimony denied Calley due process of law. The court of appeals disagreed, finding that there was no denial of due process and holding that,
even if a Jencks Act violation had occurred, such violation did not rise to
a level warranting habeas corpus relief."
13.
14.
berry,
15.
16.

519 F.2d at 228.
Judge Bell filed a dissenting opinion in which he was joined by Judges Gewin, ThornMorgan, and Clark.
18 U.S.C. A. §3500 (Rev. 1969).
519 F.2d at 220.
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The court of appeals also refused to find that nondisclosure reached a
level of constitutional significance. Whereas, the defense had sought the
testimony for use in cross-examination, the court stated that the rule was
that the testimony had to have a definite impact on the credibility of an
important witness. 7 In holding that the burden of establishing this materiality was to be carried by the defense, the court found that the requisite
materiality had not been shown in this case.
The court's decision that Congress' refusal to release the testimony did
not deny Calley due process was based on the facts that Calley was allowed
extensive discovery, including prior statements by all witnesses who appeared both before the court-martial and the congressional subcommittee,
and that the testimony before the subcommittee was equally nonavailable
to the prosecution which was not responsible for its nonproduction. In this
last respect, the court pointed out that no case has yet held under Brady
v. Maryland,'8 the leading case in this area, that the defense has a right to
receive information or evidence greater than that possessed by the prosecution. Furthermore, according to the majority, there is no abstract right on
the part of a defendant to obtain all evidence which might possibly be
helpful to his case. As to possible violations of the Jencks Act, the majority
opinion cited the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Augenblick'9
as standing for the proposition that violations of the Jencks Act do not
constitute constitutional error.
In Calley, Judge Bell dissented from this part of the majority opinion
and filed a separate opinion in which he was joined by Judges Gewin,
Thornberry, Morgan, and Clark. These judges were of the opinion that the
withholding of evidence by Congress was an error of constitutional magnitude which required either a new trial or further proceedings in the district
court. The dissenting judges took issue with two reasons given by the
majority in finding that there was no denial of due process. First, they
disagreed that the defense should meet the burden of demonstrating that
the requested testimony was material. Second, the dissenters interpreted
Brady to apply equally to all divisions of the federal government, including
Congress, and not to the "prosecution" only.
11.

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

During the period surveyed, the Fifth Circuit rendered more decisions
involving searches and seizures than any other area concerning constitutional aspects of criminal law. However, the decision to give special treatment to cases in this area was not reached solely because of sheer numerosity. Many of these decisions involved cases of first impression in this cir17. See, e.g., Flanagan v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Tashman, 478 F.2d (5th Cir. 1973).
18. 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).
19. 393 U.S. 348, 89 S.Ct. 528, 21 L.Ed.2d 537 (1969).
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cuit, and others were important because they applied new Supreme Court
standards concerning border searches.
In a case of first impression in this circuit, the court followed precedent
established by the Third Circuit' and held that 18 U.S.C.A. §3109 (Rev.
1969), which requires announcement of authority and purpose and refusal
prior to forcible entry, has no application to searches of unoccupied dwellings." The. court found that the interests protected by requiring announcement and refusal prior to breaking were: (1) the prevention of violence and
physical injury to the police and occupants; (2) the unexpected exposure
of the private activities of the occupants; and (3) the property damage
resulting from forced entry.2" Judge Ainsworth, writing for the panel,
pointed out that only the third and least significant interest in terms of
individual privacy can possibly be involved when the occupant is absent
from the premises. Therefore, in the court's opinion, it would be futile to
require the police to wait for refusal of admittance to a dwelling when no
one is home.
A case of first impression for any appellate court concerned the use of a
battery-operated "beeper device" which, when attached to an automobile,
enables the police to "track" the vehicle. This was held to be a search
within the meaning of the fourth amendment.22 The panel was unable to
find a
rational basis .. .for distinguishing the violation of the expectation of
privacy involved in the installation of a "beeper" on a car, in order to trace
its movement, from the placing of a tap on the outside
of a telephone
24
booth in order to overhear and record conversations.
25
The case of United States v.Darensbourg
indicates the degree to which
a search warrant description can be erroneous without destroying its validity. The panel reversed an order of suppression which had been based upon
a finding that a warrant description was defective because it failed to meet
the fourth amendment's particularity requirement. The description read
as follows: "Apartment #70, located at 3101 Highland Rd., in the City of
2'6
Baton Rouge.
The apartment searched was the only apartment in a multi-building
complex numbered 70, but was in fact located on July Street across a canal

20. United States v. Gervato, 474 F.2d 40 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864, 94 S.Ct.
39, 38 L.Ed.2d 84 (1973).
21. Payne v. United States, 508 F.2d 1391 (5th Cir. 1975).
22. For a discussion of this third interest see Note, Police Practicesand the Threatened
Destruction of Tangible Evidence, 84 HAav. L. Rev. 1465, 1494 (1971).
23. United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1975). The court cited only one other
decision addressing this issue. See United States v. Martyniuk, 395 F.Supp. 42 (D.Ore. 1975).
24. 521 F.2d at 865. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d
576 (1967).
25. 520 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1975).
26. Id. at 985.
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and about 300 yards from 3101 Highland Road. The apartment searched
was in the same complex as the Highland Road address. Judge Godbold,
in his dissent, argued that the finding of the district court that such a
description was constitutionally defective was not clearly erroneous.
Two cases of first impression in the Fifth Circuit involving wiretaps are
worthy of comment. United States v. Worobyzt" involved an appeal from
a finding of contempt based upon a grand jury witness' refusal to answer
questions concerning information which he claimed was derived from an
illegal wiretap. The court of appeals affirmed. The district court had held
the witness in contempt when he continued to refuse to answer questions
after the district judge had inspected the wiretap orders, affidavits, and
applications in camera and had determined that the wiretap was valid. In
affirming the district court, the Fifth Circuit reached a decision in accord
with the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits28 and in conflict with the First
Circuit,2 9 and held that the defendant did not have the right to demand
the opportunity to inspect the records.
The court sat en banc to rehear the case of United States v. Doolittle,3 °
and, in a per curiam decision, a majority of the en banc court agreed with
the panel majority in affirming the district court." However, a total of six
judges dissented. Judges Brown, Wisdom, Thornberry, Goldberg, and
Simpson dissented from the affirmance and would have reversed for the
reasons stated in Judge Thornberry's dissent to the panel decision. Judge
Godbold wrote a separate dissenting opinion. The court reconsidered the
panel decision en banc in order to have a full court determination of the
issue on which the panel divided, i.e., whether the failure to name certain
defendants in the wiretap interception order required suppression of intercepted conversations to which the defendants were parties.
The wiretap authorization referred to "Billy Cecil Doolittle and others
as yet unknown." Certain defendants, however, contended that since the
Government had reasonable cause to believe that their conversations
would be intercepted, they were not "unknown," and therefore should have
been named in the authorization. Accordingly, since they were not named,
those defendants contended that the wiretap order was illegal as to their
conversations. This argument was rejected by the majority, principally
because these defendants were unable to demonstrate any prejudice by not
having been named in the authorization.
During the survey period, the court was called upon to decide a substan522 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1975).
U.S.
See Droback v. United States, 509 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, __
95 S.Ct. 1952, 44 L.Ed.2d 450 (1975); In re Persico, 491 F.2d 1156 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
__
419 U.S. 924, 95 S.Ct. 199, 42 L.Ed.2d 158 (1974); United States v. D'Andrea, 495 F.2d 1170
(3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 855, 95 S.Ct. 101, 42 L.Ed.2d 88 (1974).
29. In re Lochiatto, 497 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1974).
30. 518 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1975).
31. The panel decision is reported at 507 F.2d 1368 (5th Cir. 1975).
27.
28.
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tial number of cases involving border searches. This area continued to be
in a state of flux and uncertainty because of recent Supreme Court
32
decisions.
Even though standards for conducting border searches were handed
down in 1973 by the United States Supreme Court in Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States,33 the Fifth Circuit continued to apply pre-Almeida-Sanchez
standards in some cases due to its decision that the new standards were
3
not retroactive.
In United States v. Hart,3 a case illustrative of the rapid changes being
made in-the law concerning border searches, it was held that AlmeidaSanchez did not prevent border patrol agents from searching the trunk of
an automobile for illegal aliens at a permanent border traffic checkpoint
where the agent had less than probable cause. However, the Supreme
Court reached a contrary decision later in the year in the case of Bowen v.
United States, and Hart can no longer be relied upon for precedent.
Several of the cases concerning border searches involved construction of
37
the recent Supreme Court decision in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
wherein the Court held that border patrol agents on "roving patrols" could
constitutionally stop vehicles to question the occupants where there existed "reasonable suspicion" that the vehicle contained aliens illegally in
the country. The case of United States v. Walker 3 is indicative of the
standards for determining "reasonable suspicion." In a per curiam opinion,
the Walker court held that the fact that border patrol agents observed
vehicles traveling together at a high rate of speed on a highway which
originated at a border town approximately fifty-two miles away supported
a reasonable belief that the vehicles concealed illegal aliens. Accordingly,
a stop to determine the citizenship of the passengers was permissible, and
the odor of marijuana emanating from inside the car gave probable cause
to search the vehicle.
In light of Brignoni-Ponce, the court in United States v. Byrd,39 another
32. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, U.S.
,95 S. Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975);
United States v. Ortiz, U.S. -, 95 S.Ct. 2585, 45 L.Ed.2d 623 (1975); Bowen v. United
States, - U.S. -,
95 S.Ct. 2569, 45 L.Ed.2d 641 (1975); United States v. Peltier, U.S. __,
95 S.Ct. 2313, 45 L.Ed.2d 374 (1975).
33. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 93 S.Ct. 2535, 37 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973).
34. United States v. Miller, 492 F.2d 37 (5th Cir. 1974); See Quarles, Constitutional
Aspects of CriminalLaw, Fifth Circuit Survey, 26 MER. L. REv. 1181 (1975). See also United
States v. Peltier, __
U.S. -, 95 S.Ct. 2313, 45 L.Ed.2d 374 (1975).
35. United States v. Hart, 506 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1975). See also United States v. Janney,
506 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1975).
36. U.S.
, 95 S.Ct. 2569, 45 L.Ed.2d 641 (1975).
37. __
U.S.
, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). See United States v. Walker,
522 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Coffey, 520 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Byrd, 520 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1975). See also United States v. Soria, 519 F.2d 1060
(5th Cir. 1975).
38. 522 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1975).
39. 520 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1975).
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per curiam decision, denied a petition for rehearing en banc. In so doing,
the panel held that a stop made by a border patrol agent which did not
meet the "reasonable suspicion" of criminal activity criterion, and where
the agent testified that he would have stopped any car traveling on that
particular road that night, was illegal when tested by Brignoni-Poncestandards. Without elaboration it was held that under Brignoni-Ponce, a stop
which resulted from a signal emanating from a signal device (checker
device) embedded in the highway approximately sixty miles from the border, did not occur at a functional equivalent of the border. 0 The court
further held the apparent Mexican ancestry of the .occupants was insufficient, standing alone, to justify the stopping of the vehicle.
The court also decided several cases involving searches by customs officers which were also controlled by "less than probable cause" requirements. That a customs agent retains the power to search passengers arriving from foreign countries even after they have passed through the routine
customs check was illustrated by the case of United States v. Chiarito."
There, a search by a customs inspector at the Miami International Airport
was upheld as reasonable where the inspector observed a man who was
wearing a bulky vest and appeared nervous, even though the man had
already successfully passed through the customs baggage checkpoint.
In a case of first impression in any appellate court, the Fifth Circuit
determined that the lenient standards applicable to customs inspections
were available to inspectors in the interior as well as at the border and at
ports of entry." In that decision, the court held that 19 U.S.C. A. §482
(Rev. 1965) authorized the search of envelopes at Birmingham, Alabama,
without meeting the probable cause requirement. This section empowers
customs officers who have "reasonable cause to suspect there is merchandise which was imported contrary to law" to search any trunk or envelope.
That 19 U.S.C. A. §482 authorizied the opening on incoming mail had been
acknowledged,43 put prior to United States v. King" no court had ruled on
searches of mail which occurred other than at a port of entry or border area.
After dismissing the contention that Almeida-Sanchez was applicable, the
court held that the search did not violate appellant's fourth amendment
rights. Judge Morgan, writing for the panel, pointed out that the sender
and addressee could have no reasonable expectation that letters mailed
from abroad would remain uninspected. Furthermore, since they would
have no idea as to the exact point in the postal process at which the
inspection occurred, they were not inconvenienced by an inspection in
Birmingham, Alabama, any more than they would have been by an inspec40.
41.
42.
43.
679, 42
44.

United States v. Del Bosque, 523 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1975).
507 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1975).
United States v. King, 517 F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1975).
United States v. Odland, 502 F.2d 148 (7th Cir., cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1088, 95 S.Ct.
L.Ed.2d 680 (1974).
517 F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1975).
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tion at the port of entry in California. Finally, the court pointed out that
searches of this nature were far less intrusive than searches of individuals
or their personal effects. In the court's opinion, Judge Morgan drew an
analogy between a letter which had passed through an initial stage in the
customs process but was still undelivered, and the situation of the appellant in Chiaritowho had passed through the initial checkpoint but had not
left the customs area. Neither was immune from a further search.
Customs searches have as their purpose the prevention of illegal importation, whereas border searches are for the purpose of preventing illegal
immigration. Searches by customs agents and border patrol officers are
governed by different requirements of reasonableness. These requirements
remain different even though both may be operating at or near the Mexican border. This difference was determinative in United States v. Soria,45
where it was held that Brignoni-Ponceand other cases relating to border
patrol agents were not applicable to customs agents. The operative facts
in this case occurred prior to Almeida-Sanchez; however, the pre-AlmeidaSanchez unfettered discretion to search vehicles within 100 miles of the
border afforded border patrol agents was not available to customs officers.
Instead, customs officers were required to have "reasonable cause" to suspect a violation of custom laws prior to conducting a search. In Soria, the
majority held that to justify a warrantless search of a vehicle by customs
agents, there must exist a reasonable nexus between the vehicle and the
border. After so holding, it was determined that the essential nexus was
not present in the facts before the court, and therefore the search in question was illegal.
While there were numerous other cases involving fourth amendment
attacks on searches and seizures, these other opinions did not say anything
new and their discussion is not felt to be justified.
Ill.

JuDIcIAL DISCRErION IN AcCEPTING PROSEcurION'S MOTION To DISMISS

Other than the Calley decision, the case of United States v. Cowan" was
probably the most noteworthy case (both in terms of national interest and
legal significance) decided in the criminal law area during the survey period. In one of the last opinions he wrote before his death on October 30,
1975, Senior Circuit Judge Murrah of the Tenth Circuit, who was sitting
by designation, dealt with yet another constitutional issue raised by the
Watergate break-in. This case interpreted for the first time Rule 48(a) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. That rule authorizes the U.S.
Attorney, by leave of court, to file a dismissal of an indictment, information or complaint.
A short statement of the facts involved is necessary before discussing
45.
46.

507 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1975).
524 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1975).
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Cowan. Briefly stated, the facts were as follows. In February 1974, a federal
grand jury in the Northern District of Texas returned a seven count indictment against Jake Jacobsen. Meanwhile, the Watergate Special Prosecution Force and Jacobsen's Washington counsel negotiated an agreement
whereby Jacobsen agreed to plead guilty to an unrelated one count charge
to be filed in the District of Columbia and to cooperate with the Watergate
Special Prosecution Force in its efforts to convict former Secretary of the
Treasury, John Connally. It was also a part of the plea agreement that the
Government would dismiss the Texas indictment. In accordance with this
agreement, the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Texas
moved under Rule 48(a) to dismiss the Texas indictment against Jacobson.
However, District Judge Hill denied the motion to dismiss and, following
the filing of notice of intention not to prosecute by the United States
Attorney, appointed private prosecutors.
One can only surmise that Judge Hill suspected that Jacobsen might be
taking advantage of the zeal of the special prosecutors in seeking to convict
Connally in order to escape being convicted of serious crimes himself in
exchange for less than creditable testimony in Connally's prosecution. In
this respect, it is interesting to observe that Jacobsen's testimony was
largely disbelieved and was not sufficient to convict John Connally.
In an exhaustive opinion, Judge Murrah attempted to preserve what the
court considered to be the proper balance of power between the executive
and judicial branches of the federal system. However, due principally to
the "leave of court" requirement found in Rule 48(a), the court of appeals
concluded that in adopting the rule, the Supreme Court intended to
"clothe the federal courts with a descretion broad enough to protect the
public interest in the fair administration of criminal justice." 7 Although
the court was of the opinion that the district judge possessed the discretion
to refuse the motion to dismiss, it nevertheless held that where an appellate court has a definite and firm conviction that the trial court had committed a clear error of judgement, the appellate court must reverse. The
court held that judicial discretion had been abused under the circumstances involved in this case since nothing in the record overcame the presumption that the prosecutors had acted in good faith in weighing the
relative importance of the two prosecutions."8
Thus, Cowan attaches great weight to the presumption of good faith on
the part of government prosecutors, and established the rule that district
judges are justified in refusing to accept a motion to dismiss only when the
presumption has clearly been rebutted.
47. Id. at 512. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039
(1974).
48. 524 F.2d at 514.
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PLEA OF GUILTY

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11 was involved in several
cases before the court during 1975. Rule 11 requires that a guilty plea shall
not be accepted unless the court first addresses the defendant and determines that the plea is voluntary and that the defendant understands the
nature and consequences of a plea of guilty.49 Under this rule, the court is
also required to inquire as to whether the plea is the result of a plea
bargain. Subsection (f) of Rule 11 further requires the trial court to be
satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea before accepting a plea
of guilty.
Rule 11 is implemented in this circuit by the standards set forth in Bryan
v. United States." Bryan requires (1) that the defendant be placed under
oath at the time of taking his plea; (2) that the district court shall state
that plea agreements are permissible and that the defendant and all counsel have a duty to disclose the existence and details of any agreement
which relates to the plea tendered; and (3) that specific inquiry be made
as to the existence of such an agreement before the plea is accepted'.5
During the course of 1975, the Fifth Circuit was called upon to apply
these standards to several and varied factual situations to determine
whether the district courts had properly complied with the requirements
of Rule 11 as implemented by Bryan. In so doing, the court made plain in
United States v. Maggio,5" that Bryan standards are applicable to all cases
involving plea bargains and not merely to those in which the prosecutor
makes a recommendation concerning sentencing. Herrera v. United
States" held that failure to inform the defendant that he would be inelegible for parole before accepting a guilty plea did not violate Rule 11. Furthermore, it was held in another case that Rule 11 did not require that the
defendant be told that the sentence will be consecutive to a sentence which
is presently being served so long as the district judge advises the defendant
of the maximum sentence and carefully questions him as to voluntariness.5

The court also ruled that full disclosure does not require that a defendant be told of collateral consequences of a conviction before the accept-

ance of a guilty plea. 5 The practice of the Alabama Department of Public
Safety in suspending the license of drivers who are convicted of driving
while intoxicated precipitated an appeal based upon Rule 11. In a decision
49. F.R.CRIM. P. 11.
50. 492 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1974).
51. Id. at 781.
52. 514 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1975).
53. 507 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1975). See also Trujillo v. United States, 377 F.2d 266 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 899, 88 S.Ct. 224, 19 L.Ed.2d 221, (1967).
54. United States v. Saldana, 505 F.2d 628 (5th Cir. 1974).
55. Moore v. Hinton, 513 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1975).
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written by Judge Morgan, it was held that such pleas were valid even
though the defendant was not told that conviction would result in suspension of his driver's license. Since the license is suspended by the Department of Public Safety rather than the court, suspension is collateral to the
conviction and the trial court is not required to inform defendants of collateral consequences. This decision carries forward the law which pre-dates
current Rule 11. It was based upon decisions which held that a defendant
cannot attack a guilty plea as being made without his being fully informed
where he is not told that a conviction will result in deportation, a dishonorable discharge, or loss of the voting franchise. 6
In Burroughs v. United States,57 the court held that the use of a signed
standard form guilty plea, a procedure which had previously been approved in United States v. Sapp,58 when amplified by identical dialogue
to that used in Sapp, was sufficient. However, the court was highly critical
of this practice and admonished district judges that the better practice
would be to take guilty pleas in a manner that develops a record which
tracks the commands of Rule 11.19
In United States v. Vera ° the court held that mere assurances by counsel
for the defendant that his client understands will not suffice under Rule
11. Similarly, the decision reached in Torres v. United States' indicates
that the appeals court will carefully scrutinize the trial record to determine
if the record fully establishes the requirement of Rule 11(f) that a judge
satisfy himself that there is a factual basis for a guilty plea. In Torres, the
court refused to uphold a conviction based upon a guilty plea where the
defendant had only a limited knowledge of the English language since the
factual basis was read into the record in English. This was held even
though the defendant was provided with an interpreter at the time of
pleading. The court felt that these circumstances did not adequately indicate that the trial judge was justified in finding a factual basis for the plea.
V.

OTHER CASES OF INTEREST

The previous sections have discussed areas of criminal law which either
have undergone significant changes, have broken new ground during the
period surveyed, or have dealt with specific cases of importance in a fairly
indepth manner. This section contains brief discussions of several additional cases, most of which are cases of first impression in the Fifth Circuit.
One case is important because it reverses the previous law in this circuit.
56. Waddy v. Davis, 445 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1975); Redwine v. Zuckert, 317 F.2d 336 (D.C.
Cir. 1963); United States v. Parrino, 212 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1954).
57. 515 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1975).
58. 439 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1971).
59. 515 F.2d at 827-28.
60. 514 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1975).
61. 505 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1974).
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All of these decisions are noteworthy, but are not as significant as Calley
or Cowan, nor do they fall into areas which were otherwise treated.
In Van Blaricom v. Forscht," the court, sitting en banc, reversed its prior
panel decision. Earl Van Blaricom's parole had been revoked by a vote of
two to one by a three-member panel of the Board of Parole. In a previous
panel decision the court had held that since 18 U.S.C. A. §4207 required
revocation by "the Board," a quorum consisting of at least a majority of
the eight-member board was necessary to revoke parole, and therefore Van
Blaricom's revocation was invalid. 3 The en banc court, however, held that
this view was too restrictive and adopted the view followed in the Tenth
Circuit. Cases from the Tenth Circuit had held that the board policy as to
revocation would be controlling and would not be overturned by the court
unless its procedures were clearly shown to be discriminatory or so lacking
in fundamental fairness as to deprive the parolee or releasee of due process,
or because the board's procedures were clearly contrary to the statutes
creating and regulating the board."4
The right to dispense with counsel is not questioned. However, the right
to dispense with effective counsel was a question of first impression in the
Fifth Circuit in United States v. Garcia." There, a balance between the
sixth amendment right to effective counsel and the basic right of a defendant to control his own defense was the goal of the court. Garcia involved
the waiver of effective counsel by a defendant. In that case, the district
judge dismissed the defendant's counsel because he found a conflict of
interest in that the attorney represented co-defendants. The defendant,
however, informed the court that he wished to retain his counsel even
though a conflict existed. In allowing defendant's request, the court
recognized that even basic rights may be waived. However, in so doing, the
court established standards which guaranteed that the record would indicate the knowing, intelligent and voluntary nature of such a waiver. It was
ordered that a Rule 11 type procedure be employed in situations involving
waiver of effective counsel so that the defendant's voluntariness and
knowledge of the consequences of his action would be manifest on the face
of the record. Furthermore, the court determined that such a waiver must
not be accepted unless it is in "clear, unequivocal and unambiguous language.""6
1
The case of Maness v. Wainwright"
was noteworthy, not because of what
it held, but because of what it did not hold. Under Florida's "voucher"
62. 511 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1975).
63. This matter had been before the Fifth Circuit on two previous occasions. See Van
Blaricom v. Forscht, 473 F.2d 1323 (5th Cir. 1973); Van Blaricorn v. Forscht, 489 F.2d 1034
(5th Cir. 1974).
64. Earnest v. Moseley, 426 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1970).
65. 517 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1975).
66. Id. at 278.
67. 512 F.2d 88 (5th Cir. 1975).
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rule, a party calling a witness "vouches" for that witness's credibility and
therefore may not attack it. It was held under the factual situation in
Maness, that such a rule was not per se a denial of due process. Maness
8
argued that under Chambers v. Mississippi"
the voucher rule cannot be
applied in a state criminal proceeding if it operates to hamper the defendant's development or presentation of a defense theory. The majority,
however, disagreed, being of the opinion that Chambers could not be so
broadly construed. The majority took notice of the fact that voucher provisions had been the subject of considerable criticism 9 and would soon be
removed from Federal practice."0 In addition, it was conceded by the majority that the operation of the voucher rule worked to the detriment of
Maness in excluding evidence which suggested his innocence. Nevertheless, it was held that the facts involved in Maness were distinguishable
from the facts in Chambers which had prompted the United States Supreme Court to hold that the defendant was denied due process because
of the operation of Mississippi's voucher rule and the hearsay rule." The
court also interpreted Chambers as standing for the proposition that state
courts were to retain wide latitude in fashioning their own rules of evidence
and procedure, and that due process did not require that state evidentiary
rules be mirror images of the evidentiary rules applied in federal courts.
While it is true that Chambers did not expressly strike down state
voucher rules, it appears to this writer that that decision does require
appellate courts to view these provisions with a critical eye toward assuring
that such rules do not operate to exclude evidence which might suggest the
innocence of the defendant. This appeared to be the underlying rationale
employed by Judge Clark in his dissenting opinion." He was of the opinion
that Chambers announced a due process principle which commanded that
every material source of evidence should be laid before the trier of fact.
Judge Clark, therefore, would have remanded for further proceedings to
assure that all facts relevant to testing for the truth were admitted.
The case of Malinauskas v. United States73 presented to the court another question of first impression in this circuit. In that case, the court was
required to determine the requisite mental competency necessary for a
defendant to plead guilty. The appellant relied upon language in several
cases which indicated that a higher degree of mental competency was
68. 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973).
69. See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973);
United States v. Prince, 491 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Torres, 477 F.2d 922
(9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Freeman, 302 F.2d 347 (2d Cir. 1962).
70. FED. R. EvID. 607, effective July 1, 1975 provides: "The credibility of a witness may
be attacked by any party, including the party calling him."
71. The hearsay rule was also involved in Maness and operated to keep out certain evidence which was sought to be introduced for impeachment purposes.
72. 512 F.2d at 93 (dissent).
73. 505 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1974).

MERCER LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 27

required to plead guilty than to stand trial." This contention, however, was
rejected, and the court followed the Tenth Circuit75 in holding that the
requisite mental competency necessary for entering a guilty plea is the
same as that required to stand trial.
The case of McMillon v. EstelleT involved a factual situation which is
not likely to occur again. In that decision the court affirmed a denial of
habeas corpus relief to a prisoner who was convicted by a jury whose
foreman was an attorney who had visited the defendant in jail to discuss
the defendant's case. The attorney was not retained and never actually
represented the defendant. In affirming a finding of lack of prejudice, it
was pointed out that the foreman-lawyer testified that she did not remember ever meeting the defendant. The court also emphasized that the attorney was originally the only juror to vote for acquittal and the first juror to
recommend probation.
VI.

CONCLUSION

As the cases discussed herein indicate, the year 1975 was not a year
marked by tremendous changes in the general area of constitutional criminal law in the Fifth Circuit. It was, however, a year in which several very
interesting and noteworthy cases were decided in this area of law by that
court. These cases, some of which received national attention, may well
prove to be landmark decisions which will be discussed, cited, and relied
upon for many years to come.
74. See White v. United States, 470 F.2d 727 (5th Cir. 1972); Johnson v. United States,
344 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1965).
75. See Wolf v. United States, 430 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1970); Crail v. United States, 430
F.2d 459 (10th Cir. 1970); Wolcott v. United States, 407 F.2d 1149 (10th Cir. 1969). See also
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 80 S.Ct. 788, 41 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1960).
76. 523 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1975).

